Looking Beyond Test Scores: The Effect of State Accountability Programs on Educational & Labor Market Outcomes

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### **Research Question**


How did state accountability programs affect educational and labor market outcomes?

#### Outline

- Institutional background
- □ Literature review
- Econometric models
- □ Data
- Results
- Policy Implications/Conclusion

## **Accountability Programs**

- State-level programs
- First introduced in 1993 by 3 states
- Federal mandate in 2001: No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
   Signed in 2002
- All 50 states & D.C. adopted by 2003



## Accountability Programs II

- Goal: place responsibility on schools to ensure <u>all</u> students proficiently educated
- State standardized testing to meet
   Academic Yearly Progress (AYP) goal
- Consequences
  - □ Rewards: additional school funding
  - Punishment: loss of school funding or school autonomy

#### Literature

- State or district level analysis: no consensus
   Improvement in test scores
   No effect/negative impact on students
- Test scores contain measurement error:
  - □ Gaming the system, cheating
    - Figlio & Getzler (2002)
    - Cullen & Reback (2002)

Mix of signal and noise (Kane & Staiger, 2002)
 Mean reversion (Chay et al, 2005)

#### Literature II

- School outcomes, not individual
- Do accountability programs lead to improvements in long-run outcomes?
- Educational:
  - Highest GradeCompleted (HGC)
  - □ High School Graduation
  - □ College Enrollment

- Labor Market:
  - Employment Status
  - □ Log Earnings
  - □ Log Hourly Wage

## Summary of Results

- Initially, results indicate TE led to large gains in education outcomes, log earnings
- After controlling for trends and fixed effects, more modest results:
  - □ White males: ↑ schooling by 0.10 years
  - □ White females: ↑ 0.10 years of schooling, 0.8 pp ↑ in HS graduation and 1.2 pp ↑ in college enrollment
- Variation in state program rules leads to heterogeneous treatment effects

#### Econometric Specification: Average Treatment Effect

 $outcome_{ist} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Account_i + X'_{ist}\alpha_2 + SQ'_{ist}\alpha_3 + \alpha_4 Adopt_{s'} + \gamma_s + \gamma_t + \gamma_{st} + \varepsilon_{ist}$ 

- Basic regression, by race and by sex
- Build up model by adding additional explanatory variables, fixed effects
  - Account: treatment variable (state of birth)
    X: age, age<sup>2</sup>, married, family size, children
    SQ: per-pupil spending, ethnic diversity
    Adopt: year that state adopted accountability

#### Econometric Specification: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

- Length of accountability exposure
  Ranges from 1 to 12 years
- Cross-state (Fletcher & Raymond, 2002)
   Number of grade levels assessed between 1<sup>st</sup> grade and 12<sup>th</sup> grade
- Intensity of testing
  - $\Box$  Minimum: < 5 times  $\rightarrow$  Low intensity
  - $\Box$  Better: Btw 5 and 8 times  $\rightarrow$  Med intensity
  - $\square$  Best: 9+ times  $\rightarrow$  High intensity

#### Data

# Scope of study: 1990 - 2006 1990, 2000: 5% Census sample

- □ 2001-2006: American Community Survey
- Individual-level data: state of birth, current state, demographics, educational attainment and labor-market outcomes
- US-born individuals between 18-30
   White: 351,163 men, 405,921 women
   Black: 82,076 men, 111,540 women

#### **Results: Basic Regression**

	Table 5: Basic Regression								
	Males								
	Highest Grade Completed	High School Diploma	College Enrollment	Employment Status	L og E arnings	L og Hourly Wages			
Treat Effect for Whites	0.125 ** (0.026)	0.038**(0.005)	0.043**(0.007)	0.000 (0.003)	0.187** (0.023)	0.000 (0.000)			
Treat Effect for Blacks	0.173 ** (0.044)	0.046**(0.007)	0.026**(0.008)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.131** (0.031)	0.002 (0.001)			
Observations (Whites) Observations (Blacks)	351,163 82,076	351,163 82,076	351,163 82,076	174,107 40,013	164,360 35,627	164,360 35,627			
	Females								
	Highest Grade Completed	High School Graduation	College Enrollment	Employment Status	L og E arnings	L og Hourly Wages			
Treat Effect for Whites Treat Effect for Blacks	0.247** (0.029) 0.214** (0.026)	0.046**(0.005) 0.062**(0.006)	0.068**(0.008) 0.058**(0.006)	0.004 (0.006) 0.022**(0.009)	0.228** (0.020) 0.133** (0.029)	0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001)			
Observations (Whites) Observations (Blacks)	40 <i>5</i> ,921 111,540	405,921 111,540	405,921 111,540	196,090 52,494	166,111 44,073	166,111 44,073			
School Quality Measures			No						
Year of Adoption State and Year Dummies	No No								
State by Year Dummies	No								

#### State by Year Fixed Effects

	Table 9: State By Tear Fixed Effects							
	Males							
	Highest Grade Completed	High School Diploma	College Enrollment	Employment Status	L og E arnings	Log Hourly Wages		
Treat Effect for Whites	0.071**(0.029)	0.004 (0.004)	0.009 (0.006)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.000)		
Treat Effect for Blacks	0.013 (0.039)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.002)		
Observations (Whites) Observations (Blacks)	351,163 82,076	351,163 82,076	351,163 82,076	174,107 40,013	164,360 35,627	164,360 35,627		
	Females							
	Highest Grade Completed	High School Graduation	College Enrollment	Employment Status	L og E amings	Log Hourly Wages		
Treat Effect for Whites	0.065**(0.023)	0.008** (0.003)	0.012** (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.017)	-0.001*(0.000)		
Treat Effect for Blacks	0.028 (0.032)	0.003 (0.005)	0.011 (0.009)	0.005 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.023)	0.000 (0.001)		
Observations (Whites)	405,921	405,921	405,921	196,090	166,111	166,111		
Observations (Blacks)	111,540	111,540	111,540	52,494	44,073	44,073		
School Quality Measures			Y es					
Year of Adoption	Y es							
State and Year Dummies	Yes							
State by Y ear Dummies	Y es							

Table 9: State By Vear Fixed Effects

#### Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

# Longer lengths of treatment → larger TE Intensity of testing:

	Males							
	Highest Grade	High School	College	Employment	Log	L og Hourly		
	Completed	Diploma	Enrollment	Status	Earnings	Wages		
Low Intensity Testing								
Treat Effect for Whites	0.057 (0.047)	0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000 (0.003)	0.026 (0.019)	-0.001* (0.000)		
Treat Effect for Blacks	0.051 (0.045)	0.007 (0.012)	0.001 (0.011)	0.000 (0.018)	-0.044 (0.045)	0.002 (0.007)		
Medium Intensity Testing								
Treat Effect for Whites	0.058 (0.041)	0.002 (0.004)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.000 (0.000)		
Treat Effect for Blacks	-0.009 (0.044)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.011)	0.024 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.002)		
High Intensity Testing								
Treat Effect for Whites	0.160** (0.065)	0.016**(0.006)	0.022**(0.010)	0.021**(0.007)	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.001)		
Treat Effect for Blacks	0.046 (0.064)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.017 (0.025)	0.014 (0.011)	-0.069 (0.042)	0.001 (0.001)		
	Females							
	Highest Grade	High School	College	Employment	Log	Log Hourly		
	Completed	Graduation	Enrollment	Status	Earnings	Wages		
Low Intensity Testing	-				-	-		
Treat Effect for Whites	0.028 (0.047)	0.000 (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)	0.011*(0.007)	-0.009 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.001)		
Treat Effect for Blacks	0.042 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.008 (0.013)	0.019 (0.014)	0.090 (0.062)	-0.003 (0.002)		
Medium Intensity Testing								
Treat Effect for Whites	0.059* (0.033)	0.009**(0.004)	0.011* (0.006)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.001)		
Treat Effect for Blacks	-0.001 (0.032)	0.004 (0.004)	0.011 (0.009)	0.001 (0.015)	-0.031 (0.021)	0.001 (0.001)		
High Intensity Testing								
Treat Effect for Whites	0.178** (0.045)	0.019**(0.005)	0.028**(0.007)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.048 (0.045)	-0.001** (0.001)		
Treat Effect for Blacks	0.096* (0.052)	0.003 (0.009)	0.014 (0.017)	0.002 (0.019)	-0.084*(0.043)	-0.000 (0.001)		

Table 11: Cross-State Variation in Testing Intensity

#### Conclusions

- NCLB is up for renewal  $\rightarrow$  successful?
  - □ Small average treatment effects
  - Improvements only for whites, further widening the black-white achievement gap
- Room for improvement? Maybe
  - Correlation between the strength of state program rules and the magnitude of the treatment effect